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Abstract
This paper describes a process of problem identification
and resolution in DRAM manufacturing.  Information
overload and interpretation are key issues for trouble
management in DRAM manufacturing processes.
Empirical observation leads us to identify issues in
developing knowledge management systems.
Introduction
This paper addresses issues of knowledge
management in one group of high-precision organizations
- DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory)
manufacturing companies in the semiconductor industry.
It describes engineering practices in DRAM production
processes and the nature of knowledge production
activities in the light of organizational learning.  It
identifies factors that shape the process of knowledge
accumulation.  Lessons from the DRAM production
process are used to address the issues of the development
of information infrastructure to facilitate the processes of
knowledge management.
Knowledge Management in High Precision
Organizations
DRAM manufacturing provides a unique showcase of
high-precision organizations.  DRAM manufacturers must
acquire a high product yield, defined as a ratio of DRAM
chips functioning correctly to one unit of silicon wafer.
DRAM manufacturing operations often start at the yield
ratio lower than 20 percent, but they reach 90 percent or
higher before any current generation of DRAM product
becomes obsolete (usually within three years).  Higher
product yield means higher productivity and profit for the
DRAM manufacturer.  A major obstacle to high product
yield is defects, caused by contaminants on the chip or
deformed circuit (Van Zant, 1984).  Defect control is a
central part of the engineering practice in DRAM
production.
Traditional defect control consists of collecting
operation data during the DRAM manufacturing process,
analyzing the data according to the engineering
specifications and integrating the results into the next
batch of the silicon wafer production process (Wang and
Akella, 1995; Perez and Koh, 1993).  However, actual
DRAM engineering practice for higher yield requires
more than just defect control.  It requires management of
knowledge acquired through the DRAM engineering
practice - trouble management for higher yield.  This is a
process of finding solutions to resolve defect problems
and deciding which solution is proper for a given
problem.  Identifying defects and matching yield-reducing
problems with potential solutions must be done without
sacrificing the objective of product yield increase.
DRAM trouble management creates information overload
because potential solutions are abundant.  Selecting one
solution necessitates an elimination of the other options
(Field Interview, 1997).  Experience acquired at earlier
production stages helps DRAM engineers to achieve a
higher product yield at later stages.  Yield increase is
achieved through repetitive and routine processes of
seeking technology and production solutions.  As Arrow
(1962) suggested, technologically complex, emerging
industries require that learning takes place mainly through
actual attempts at production.  DRAM trouble
management requires production experience as a
condition of product yield increase.
Trouble Management in DRAM
Manufacturing Process
One of the most important factors in DRAM trouble
management is the tension between chip density and chip
reliability, caused by the drive for higher product yield.
Greater numbers of transistor cells in a given area leads to
higher density of the DRAM chip, resulting in more
DRAM chips produced per silicon wafer.  However,
denser chips become more vulnerable to contaminants
during the manufacturing process and introduce problems
related to the size of wires and circuit structures.  DRAM
trouble management requires balancing the tension
between chip density and chip reliability.
A common problem encountered in the DRAM
manufacturing process is a broken interconnection wire
(Field interview, 1997).  Identifying the location of the
broken wire is normally done by physical examination of
the silicon wafer by a high-precision defect detection
device.  On one occasion, DRAM engineers couldn't
figure out the cause of the problem.  Only a small number
of failures had occurred, and the defect control system did
not contain enough data for a useful analysis.  After
numerous attempts, DRAM engineers found that the line
was broken by the light reflected on the underlying layer
during the photo-lithography process.  The traditional
engineering approach to a problem handling failed to
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reveal this.  Engineers from three different areas of
DRAM production differed in their opinions of how to
define the issue.  Designers wanted to change a part of
manufacturing process because they felt the process
change would result in a more reliable DRAM product
without sacrificing chip density.  Process engineers
wanted to change the circuit design because they thought
this would be simple and did not want to introduce any
additional failure.  Process integration engineers worked
with designers and process engineers to find a technical
fix to resolve the issue.  A simple case of a broken wire
gave different meanings to engineers in heterogeneous
production areas.  The broken wire became a boundary
object (Star and Griesemer, 1989) by which
heterogeneous participants collaborated for the resolution
of the problem.  Engineers from heterogeneous areas of
DRAM manufacturing had heterogeneous interpretation of
the same technical problem until they reached to a
developed homogeneous view of the problem through
interpreting information and giving meanings to the
information (Daft and Weick,1984).  In the process,
organizational learning changed a range of potential
behaviors and routines in the organization (March,
Sproull, and Tamuz, 1991; Huber, 1991).
Conclusion
The study of DRAM trouble management practice
provides a useful insight on the scope of organizational
learning in high-precision organizations.  The study
suggests that the process of seeking information and using
it is shaped by two types of tension: social tension caused
by the division of labor (engineering specialization) and
technical tension caused by inherent physical limits of the
DRAM manufacturing.  These tensions are resolved
through an evolving process of problematization (Callon,
1981) with changing organizational routines and rules to
which the engineers conform.
Diverse interpretation of information occurs routinely
in DRAM trouble management, but current engineering
strategies do not capture the essence of knowledge learned
through such processes.  Designing information systems
supporting such knowledge work efforts will be better
served by understanding a context of information
interpretation practiced by knowledge experts.
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